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Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State:
Calibrating First Amendment Protections for
Leakers of Classified Information
Heidi Kitrosser*
INTRODUCTION
The stakes are higher now than ever before in determining the First Amend-
ment protections due government insiders who leak classified information to the
press. Prior to the George W. Bush administration, only one person in American
history had been successfully prosecuted for such a leak, and only two prosecu-
tions had been brought.' The Bush administration placed greater heat on
leakers. It successfully prosecuted one leaker and opened investigations against
others. The Obama administration turned the heat to levels that are stifling. By
the end of its third year, the Administration had initiated six prosecutions,
doubling the number previously brought by all past administrations combined .
The rise in prosecutions, coupled with other developments - most notably a
series of disclosures from the WikiLeaks website - has brought a renewed focus
to the First Amendment status of classified information and those who dissemi-
nate it. Most of the attention and concern, however, have centered on the
protections due non-governmental third parties who publish information that is
leaked to them. A common, albeit not unanimous, refrain among academic
commentators is that third-party publishers merit substantial First Amendment
protections.4 Commentators warn, for example, that prosecuting WikiLeaks
would open the proverbial door to prosecuting The New York Times or other
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University School of Law. Thanks to Mary-Rose Papandrea for suggesting that I write this piece and to
Geof Stone, Mary-Rose Papandrea, Daniel Hoffman, Emily Berman, Bill Banks and two anonymous
reviewers for their excellent comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Molly Pyle and the Georgetown
Law student editors for their diligent editorial work. Finally, I benefitted greatly from feedback that I
received during presentations at the Yale Law School Information Society Project, Northwestern
University School of Law "Faculty Scholarship Day," and a joint panel of the Media Law and National
Security Law sections of the American Association of Law Schools. © 2013, Heidi Kitrosser.
1. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Administration Takes a Hard Line Against Leaks to the Press, N.Y. TIMES,
June 11, 2010, at Al; Eli J. Lake, Trouble for Journalists: Low Clearance, NEW REPuBLIC, Oct. 10,
2005, at 13.
2. See Heidi Kitrosser, What If Daniel Ellsberg Hadn't Bothered?, 45 INn. L. Rv. 89, 111 (2011);
Heidi Kitrosser, Supremely Opaque?, Accountability, Transparency, and Presidential Supremacy, 5 U.
ST. THOMAS J. L. & PuB. Poi'Y 62, 105-106 (2010).
3. Charlie Savage, Ex-C.LA. Officer Charged in Information Leak, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2012, at Al.
4. For dissenting views to the effect that the press and other third-party leakers merit considerably
weaker protection than the conventional wisdom would have it, see, for example, Gabriel Schoenfeld,
Has The New York Times Violated the Espionage Act?, COMMENTARY, Mar. 2006; John C. Eastman,
Listening to the Enemy: The President's Power To Conduct Surveillance of Enemy Communications
During Time of War, 13 ILSA J. OF INT'L & COMp. L. 49, 57-66 (2006).
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traditional news sources that regularly publish classified information. 5 Similar
concerns were expressed when the Bush administration brought the first prosecu-
tion in history against two government outsiders to whom classified information
was leaked.6
Yet commentators are notably less outspoken on the topic of protecting
government insiders who leak information to the press in the first place. There
simply has not been much sustained academic focus on the topic. Of the
commentary that exists, the common view is that publishers must be strongly
protected under the First Amendment, while leakers can be punished with little
or no constitutional difficulty.7 The distinction is said to turn largely on the fact
that persons with authorized access to classified information are in special
positions of trust and thus have effectively waived protections against prosecu-
tion for leaks.8 To be sure, this argument and related points have their dissent-
ers.9 Nonetheless, a comprehensive case for providing leakers with substantial
First Amendment protections from prosecution remains to be made.'°
5. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle Over the Soul of
the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 314, 365 (2011); Jonathan Peters,
Wikileaks, The First Amendment, and the Press, HARV. L. & PoL'Y REV., Apr. 18, 2011, available at
http://hlpronline.com/2011/04/wikileaks-the-first-amendment-and-the-press (for prepared statement of
Stephen I. Vladeck, Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law and testimony
of Geoffrey R. Stone, Professor and Former Dean, University of Chicago Law School); Espionage Act
and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by Wikileaks, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, ll1th Cong. 71 (2010).
6. See, e.g., Jack Shafer, A Gitmofor Journalists, SLAm (Mar. 14, 2006), available at http://www.slate.
com/articles/newsand-politics/press_box/2006/03/agitmo-for_.joumos.html; Lake, supra note 1, at 16.
7. For commentary that defends strong press protections, but notes in passing that leakers likely
warrant relatively little protection, see, for example, Benkler, supra note 5, at 363-364; Mary Rose
Papandrea, The Publication of National Security Information in the Digital Age, 5 J. NAT'L SEC. L. &
PoL'Y 119, 127-128 (2011). For commentary that directly considers leaker protections and reaches
similar conclusions, see, for example, Geoffrey R. Stone, Wikileaks, the Proposed Shield Act, and the
First Amendment, 5 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & Poi'Y 105, 111-114 (2011); William E. Lee, The Role of
Whistleblowers To Facilitate Government Accountability 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1473, 1486-1489,
1529 (2008); Keith Werhan, Rethinking Freedom of the Press After 9/11, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1561,
1595-1598 (2008).
8. See Stone, supra note 7, at 111-113; Lee, supra note 7, at 1486-1489; Werhan, supra note 7, at
1597-1598.
9. See Mika C. Morse, Note, Honor or Betrayal? The Ethics of Government Lawyer- Whistleblowers,
23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmics 421, 422-424 (2010) (discussing democratic and constitutional value of
national security whistleblowers, particularly those who are government lawyers); James A. Goldston,
et al., Comment, A Nation Less Secure: Diminished Public Access to Information, 21 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 409, 436-459 (1986) (advocating strong leaker protections); cf Stephen I. Vladeck, The
Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing After Garcetti, 57 AMER. U. L. REv. 1531,
1533-1535, 1546 (2008) (suggesting that the dearth of federal whistleblower protections is of concern,
though not taking a position on whether and to what extent such protections should exist).
10. While I argued for strong leaker protections in an earlier article, that article focused on
protections both for leakers and for third-party publishers. It also was written before the developments
of the Obama administration and before some of the important scholarship, to which this essay
responds, was published. See generally Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech,
2008 U. IL. L. REV. 881 (2008).
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This article argues that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, leakers merit
robust First Amendment protections against prosecution. In Part I, the article
summarizes the two major arguments against protection. The first, more sweep-
ing position is that all leaks of "classified speech" - meaning the unauthorized
conveyance or retention of classified information by anyone, whether a govern-
ment insider or third-party publisher -are fully or largely unprotected. The
second, more nuanced view is that classified speech must be protected when
disseminated by third-party publishers, but that government insiders who leak
classified information should be little shielded from prosecution. In addition to
summarizing these positions as taken in academic and political forums and legal
briefs, Part I discusses aspects of the case law that support them.
Part II challenges the views summarized in Part I. It explains that there is
widespread consensus that a major concern underlying the First Amendment's
speech and press clauses is the need for information flow to support constitu-
tional democracy. Furthermore, the executive branch itself is designed to enable
insiders and outsiders to discover and respond to executive misdeeds. The free
speech and press clauses are among the mechanisms that support this design.
These mechanisms would lose essential meaning if speech could be stripped of
most or all First Amendment protection by virtue of its being stamped "classi-
fied," or if executive branch insiders - the only persons structurally situated to
discover executive misdeeds - were stripped of protection by virtue of their
insider status. These theoretical points are very much bolstered by the twin
realities of massive over-classification and selective leaks of classified informa-
tion from the top of the executive branch. Given these realities, a wide discre-
tion to prosecute classified information leaks amounts to a roving commission
to punish or chill speech that embarrasses or otherwise displeases high-level
executive branch officers. Part II concludes by observing that while aspects of
judicial doctrine are helpful to those who champion leaker prosecutions, there is
precedent supporting leaker protection.
Part III discusses the doctrinal standards that should apply to punishments of
classified information leaks. The complicated constitutional status of govern-
ment insiders and the potential value and danger of leaks call for delicate
calibration. Standards must reflect both the dangers of leaks and those of
excessive chilling. They also must reflect the two sides of a leaker's constitu-
tional status: as insider subject to executive control and as source of potentially
valuable information. These multiple and conflicting considerations counsel
different levels of First Amendment protection depending on whether the leaker
is punished by the government in the latter's capacity as employer or whether
she is punished through criminal or civil penalties. In the former cases, the
government's claim of right over the employee is at its apex, although free
speech values also hang in the balance. In such cases, the balancing test
developed by the Supreme Court for evaluating employment-based repercus-
sions against government employees should be applied. In the prosecutorial and
civil punishment contexts, a higher level of protection is warranted. Courts also
2013]
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should consider varying the government's burden with the level of punishment
sought in civil and criminal actions.
Part III also addresses objections to calibrating First Amendment protections
based on a penalty's institutional nature or severity. It explains that calibrating
by institutional context - that is, by whether one is punished by government in
its capacity as employer or as sovereign - is consistent with existing doctrine.
What would require new justification is not institutional calibration, but extend-
ing government's leeway to fire or demote to the criminal or civil punishment
context. Furthermore, calibration based on institutional context is warranted as a
matter of constitutional theory. Calibration based solely on a penalty's severity,
on the other hand, is on more tenuous doctrinal and theoretical footing. Part III
also explains, nonetheless, that severity-based calibration is not without doctri-
nal precedent and that it is warranted in at least some cases as a matter of
constitutional theory.
Finally, one clarifying point and two notes on this project's scope are in order.
First, this article refers alternately to insider leakers of classified information as
"government insiders" or "government employees." The term employee is used
somewhat loosely, as leakers may include government employees, former em-
ployees, or contractors who obtained classified information through the access
privileges of their positions. Second, this essay does not directly address
statutory provisions for punishing leakers. The United States does not have an
"official secrets" act that makes it categorically illegal to retain or disseminate
classified information. Nonetheless, the breadth and malleability of the Espio-
nage Act - which has been the primary vehicle used to prosecute leaks or
publications of classified information - mean that the Act can be interpreted
similarly to an official secrets act." The extent of any First Amendment
protections must be considered in order to determine whether certain applica-
tions of the Act or other existing or future statutes are constitutional. Third, this
essay also does not directly consider statutory whistleblower protections. Con-
gress does, of course, have the power to pass such laws, and several such
statutes exist. Nonetheless, these statutes leave serious gaps and points of
uncertainty for whistleblowers. This is particularly so for national security
whistleblowers who handle classified information. 12 More importantly, however
comprehensive a set of protections Congress may or may not enact, the First
Amendment remains the ultimate protective backstop. As we shall see in Part
11. See, e.g., Kitrosser, What If Daniel Ellsberg Hadn't Bothered?, supra note 2, at 107-108 and
sources cited therein; Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive
Power and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 395-396 (1986) (noting that
"[t]he legislative history of' §§793(d) and (e) of the Act "indicates that Congress did not understand
them to criminalize conduct engaged in for publication purposes. But how they can be narrowed to
effectuate this understanding is a mystery").
12. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 9, at 1533-1537, 1542-1546; Mary Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs,
Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security Information, 83 IND. L. J. 233, 245-248
(2008); Morse, supra note 9, at 439-442.
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II, courts should consider statutory or regulatory whistleblower provisions in
applying the relevant First Amendment standards to particular facts. Where a
leaker bypasses statutory whistleblower procedures, for example, courts may
consider that fact in determining the objective reasonableness of the leaker's
belief that her leak would serve the public interest and that it would cause little
harm. The inquiry also should take into account the adequacy of the statutory
procedures. This is a very different thing, however, from the view that statutory
or regulatory procedures can substitute for the protections of the First Amend-
ment. 
1 3
I. THE Two MAJOR CATEGORIES OF ARGUMENT AGAINST PROTECTING LEAKERS
A. A Broad-Brush Approach: Classified Information Leaks, Conveyances,
or Retentions Merit Little or No First Amendment Protection
1. Executive Branch Legal Positions, Public and Academic Commentary
In seeking to prosecute insider leaks or possession or - in the case of the
George W. Bush administration - third-party transmittal of classified informa-
tion, the Obama, Bush, and Reagan administrations have argued that such
prosecutions do not implicate the First Amendment in any way. For example,
the Obama administration argued in prosecuting alleged leaker Thomas Drake
that "[a] restriction upon the retention of classified documents is an inhibition of
action, not protected free speech."14 In the alternative, the Administration
argued that even if the possession of such documents is speech, it is speech
"integral to criminal conduct" and thus unprotected. 15
As if anticipating the Obama administration's first two arguments, the Bush
administration argued in United States v. Rosen that even third-party, oral
dissemination of classified information is not speech and warrants no First
Amendment protection.1 6 The Administration deemed classified information
property, and its unauthorized dissemination pure theft. 17 Alternatively, the
Administration urged that even if such transmission constitutes speech, it is
categorically unprotected speech because it is classified and "relates to the
national defense."' 8 The Reagan administration also appears -extrapolating
from court opinions in United States v. Morison - to have made arguments very
13. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court came uncomfortably close to embracing just such a substitu-
tion rationale in the limited context of government employee speech that constitutes a part of the
employee's job. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425-426 (2006).
14. Government's Response to Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Counts One Through Five of the
Indictment, United States v. Drake, 818 F. Supp. 2d 909 (D. Md. Mar. 11, 2011) (No. 10 CR 00181
RDB).
15. Id.
16. Government's Supplemental Response to Defendant's Motion To Dismiss the Superseding
Indictment at 22, 29-30, United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2006) (No.
1:05 cr225).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 34.
2013] 413
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similar to those later employed in the Bush and Obama administrations.1 9 That
is, in prosecuting Samuel Morison for leaking classified information to the
press, the Administration apparently argued that Morison had engaged in no
speech, but instead had committed theft.2°
The premise that classified leaks - and even third-party publications - are
non-speech crimes, or at minimum that classification status is conclusive on the
issue whether speech is too dangerous to disclose, also is manifest in much
public and political discourse. For example, some politicians and public commen-
tators deem employees who leak classified information, and media figures that
publish the information, akin to enemy combatants, terrorists, or traitors; some
have even called for such persons to be executed. 21 The same premise underly-
ing these dramatic statements was manifest in Senator Joe Lieberman's success-
ful call for Internet service providers "hosting WikiLeaks to immediately
terminate [their] relationship with them," and in related boycotts of WikiLeaks
by credit card companies and other service providers.22
19. See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1068-1070 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655, 664 (D. Md. 1985)
20. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1077.
21. See, e.g., Senate GOP Leader: WikiLeaks Head a "Terrorist," SALON, Dec. 5, 2010, available at
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2010/12/05/us us-wikileaksmcconnell (citing Senator Mitch Mc-
Connell's call to prosecute Julian Assange as a terrorist); Helen Kennedy, WikiLeaks Should Be
Designated a "Foreign Terrorist Organization," Rep. Pete King Fumes, DAILY NEWS.COM (Nov. 28,
2010), available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/2010/11/28/2010-11-28_mediaunveils_
classifieddocuments via wikileakswebsitejin_ explosiverelease of html (citing similar call by Rep-
resentative Pete King); Glenn Greenwald, WikiLeaks Reveal More Than Just Government Secrets,
SALON (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.salon.com/news/opinionlglenn-greenwaldl2OlOll/30/wikileaks/
index.html (quoting former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin who accused Assange of "treason" and urged
that he be pursued "with the same urgency that we pursue Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders"); James
Hohmann, Gingrich Faults Obama Administration Over WikiLeaks, POLITICO (Dec. 5, 2010), avail-
able at http://www.politico.com/blogs/politicolive/1210/Gingrich-faultsObama_ administration for_
WikiLeakshandling.html (describing former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich's call to treat Julian
Assange as an enemy combatant); Attack by WikiLeaks: Assange is an Enemy of the U.S., But the U.S.
Keeps Too Many Secrets, WALL STREET J., Dec. 1, 2010, at 13 (arguing that those who provide classified
information to Wikileaks should be subject to the death penalty and that Assange should be treated as
an enemy combatant); Robert Booth & Haroon Siddique, How WikiLeaks Altered the Way We See the
World in Just a Week, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2010), available at http://www.guardian.co.uklmedia/2010/
dec/04/wikileaks-world-week-cables (citing former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee's conclusion
that Bradley Manning should be executed for providing classified files to Wikileaks); Joe Garofoli,
Fanning the Flames: Melanie Morgan's Swing from Liberal to Right-Wing Radio Shouter May Not
Have Happened Overnight, But It's Permanent - And Profitable, S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 8, 2006, at CM-8
(quoting San Francisco talk radio host's view that editors of newspapers that publish classified
information can be convicted of treason and executed).
22. See Benkler, supra note 5, at 313-314, 338-342; Mark Townsend, Paypal Joins Internet
Backlash Against WikiLeaks, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2010), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
media/2010/dec/04/paypal-internet-backlash-wikileaks; Dan Gillmor, Online, the Censors Are Scoring
Big Wins, SALON (Dec. 3, 2010), available at http://www.salon.comtechnology/dan-gillmor/2010/12/03/
the net s softunderbelly/index.html; Charles Arthur, WikiLeaks Cables Visualisation Pulled After
Pressure from Joe Lieberman, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2010), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/blog/2010/dec/03/wikileaks-tableau-visualisation-joe-lieberman; Glenn Greenwald, More Joe
Lieberman-Caused Internet Censorship, SALON (Dec. 2, 2010), available at http://www.salon.com/newsl
opinion/glenn-greenwald/2010/12/02/censorship/index.html.
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A somewhat less radical premise, but one conducive to similar conclusions, is
that the President - acting either directly or through the many executive branch
subordinates to whom the power to classify information is delegated - must
have the final word as to when speech is too dangerous to be disclosed. From
this perspective, it need not necessarily be the case that classified speech is not
speech, or that all classified information truly is too dangerous to disclose.
Rather, in an imperfect world of imperfect decision-making, someone must
make the final call as to when information is too dangerous to disclose, and that
person is the President, whether acting directly or through subordinates. To
proponents of this view, including some academic commentators, this is the
case either because the presidency is the institution most competent to have the
final word, or because the Constitution demands that he have this authority, or
both.23
2. Doctrinal Support
This section discusses doctrinal support for the position that conveying or
retaining classified information without authorization, however and by whom-
ever, warrants little if any First Amendment protection. In short, this sub-section
analyzes support in the case law for the notion that classified information carries
a very different constitutional status than virtually any other type of information
or speech about government or public policy. For adherents to this view, the
rigorous judicial safeguards that the First Amendment would otherwise demand
when speech is punished for its content simply do not apply in the classified
information context.
The Supreme Court has decided no cases that directly involve prosecutions
for leaking or publishing classified information. Nonetheless, some statements
by the Court and individual Justices in related cases reflect the view that
classification may effectively remove, or substantially diminish, any First Amend-
ment protections that would otherwise attach to those who disseminate informa-
tion. For example, while the Court famously refused, in New York Times Co. v.
United States, to authorize an injunction to stop The New York Times from
publishing the Pentagon Papers, three members of the Court suggested in
concurrences that post-publication criminal punishment of The New York Times
might be permissible, and three members dissented on the ground that they
would have granted a prior restraint.24 In a dissenting opinion joined by Chief
23. See GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, NECESSARY SECRETS 64-65, 187-191, 204 (2010); Eastman, supra note
4, at 57-58, 64-66.
24. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (denying government
request for prior restraint); id. at 730-731, 733 (White, J., concurring) (concurring - in an opinion by
Justice White joined by Justice Stewart - "only because of the concededly extraordinary protection
against prior restraints" and noting that newspapers will not be "immune from criminal action" if they
proceed to publish the documents that the government sought to restrain); id. at 743 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (noting that "we are not faced with a situation where Congress has failed to provide the
Executive with broad power to protect the Nation from disclosure of damaging state secrets," as
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Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, Justice Harlan deemed the judiciary's role
in reviewing the executive's judgment on foreign affairs, including whether to
suppress information, "very narrowly restricted. 25
In the 1980 case of Snepp v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld a
contract whereby former CIA agent Frank Snepp had agreed to submit any
writings about the CIA to the agency for pre-publication review. The Court also
approved a constructive trust against proceeds garnered by Snepp for writings
not submitted for review. 26 While the Snepp Court emphasized the existence of
a contractual agreement, it also placed much weight on the review's purpose to
protect classified information. The Court explained that "[w]hen a former agent
relies on his own judgment about what information is detrimental, he may
reveal information that the CIA - with its broader understanding of what may
expose classified information and confidential sources - could have identified as
harmful. 2 7 The Court suggested that the government's interest would be much
less significant were the information unclassified. Indeed, some lower courts
have cited Snepp for the proposition that "'[t]he government has no legitimate
interest in censoring unclassified materials,"' and, thus, "'may not censor such
material, contractually or otherwise.' ' 28 For the Snepp court and lower courts,
then, the fact that information is classified greatly enhances the government's
constitutional power to control its dissemination through contractual conditions
of employment.
This theme is echoed in some other lower court opinions. Indeed, in the only
federal appellate court opinion to rule directly on the constitutionality of
prosecuting leakers, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in United
States v. Morison, characterized an employee's leak of satellite photos to the
press as pure theft.29 It deemed no "First Amendment rights ... implicated" by
his prosecution.3° Judge Russell's 1988 opinion for the court in that case relied
heavily on Morison's position as a government employee who had signed
statutes provide for post-publication criminal penalties); id. at 752, 755-759 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(dissenting - in an opinion by Justice Harlan joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black-
mun - from the Court's denial of the prior restraint sought by the government).
25. Id. at 756 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
26. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 513 n.8, 515-516 (1980).
27. Id. at 512.
28. Wilson v. CIA, 586 F.3d 171, 185 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137,
1141 (D.C. Cir. 1983) and citing Snepp, 444 U.S. at 513 n.8, for the proposition that "[i]f in fact
information is unclassified or in the public domain, neither the CIA nor foreign agencies would be
concerned"); see also Snepp, 444 U.S. at 511 ("the government does not deny -as a general prin-
ciple - Snepp's right to publish unclassified information"); McGehee, 718 F.2d at 1141 (quoting United
States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1313 (4th Cir. 1972) and citing Snepp, 444 U.S. at 513 n.8, for the
proposition that unclassified information may not be restricted by contract or otherwise); cf Weaver v.
U.S. Information Agency, 87 F.3d 1429, 1435-1436, 1442 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (deeming review
requirement for unclassified information acceptable because it does not entail punishments for unap-
proved publications, indicating that serious First Amendment problems would exist were punishments
imposed).
29. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1068-1070.
30. Id.
416 [Vol. 6:409
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non-disclosure forms. Yet the opinion also rested implicitly on the special status
of classified information and the executive's control of the same. Among the
cases invoked at length by Judge Russell were Snepp and an earlier Fourth
Circuit case, United States v. Marchetti.31 Like Snepp, Marchetti had involved a
former CIA employee's pre-publication clearance agreement. As the Snepp
Court would later do, the Marchetti court emphasized that the executive branch's
control over employee speech is substantially heightened in the context of
classified information, given the President's constitutional authority to keep
secrets and protect national security. 32 Indeed, the Marchetti court stated that
the First Amendment would preclude equivalent restraints on government em-
ployees "with respect to information which is unclassified or officially dis-
closed.",
33
Finally, three recent district court opinions provide partial support for those
who deem classified information unprotected or substantially less protected than
other speech. In rejecting Thomas Drake's motion to dismiss the government's
indictment against him for allegedly leaking classified information, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland, which sits within the Fourth Circuit,
cited its circuit's controlling precedent in United States v. Morison. The Drake
Court cited Morison for the proposition that the statute under which Drake was
prosecuted was not overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, as Drake
remained free under it to discuss unclassified information.3 4
Two opinions of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia - also within the Fourth Circuit - in United States v. Rosen are somewhat
more mixed in assessing the First Amendment protections due third parties who
disseminate leaked information. On the one hand, a 2006 opinion issued in
response to the defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment on First Amend-
ment grounds suggested that classification might effectively be decisive in
making speech punishable.35 Yet a subsequent opinion softened the potential
extremity of the earlier one. Among other things, the second opinion, issued in
February 2009, clarified that the jury must independently determine if the
Espionage Act's criteria for illegal communications are met.36 It explained:
[Elvidence that information is classified is, at most, evidence that the govern-
ment intended that the designated information be closely held. Yet, evidence
that information is classified is not conclusive on this point ... . Further, the
government's classification decision is inadmissible hearsay on the second
31. Id. at 1069-1070.
32. Marchetti, 466 F2d at 1312, 1315-1318.
33. Id. at 1313; see also id. at 1317 ("We would decline enforcement of the secrecy oath ... to the
extent that it purports to prevent disclosure of unclassified information.")
34. United States v. Drake, 818 F. Supp. 2d 909,917-918 (D. Md. 2011).
35. See Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, supra note 10, at 902-903
(citing Rosen, No. 1:05cr225, slip op. at 53-56 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2006) (order denying motion to
dismiss)).
36. United States v. Rosen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 690, 695 (E.D. Va. 2009)
2013]
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prong of the... [statutory definition of national defense information,] namely
whether unauthorized disclosure might potentially damage the United States
or an enemy of the United States.
3 7
Still, the February 2009 opinion marks a far cry from the First Amendment
protections ordinarily applied when speech is prosecuted as a threat to national
security. Ordinarily - that is, at least where speech does not include classified
information - speech can be punished as a threat to national security only when
it is intended and is likely to cause imminent illegal activity.
3
B. A Finer-Grained Approach: Even If Third-Party Publishers Are Protected,
Leakers Ought Not To Be
1. An Overview of Major Arguments to the Effect that Insider Status Removes
or Substantially Diminishes Protection
From the view that classified information warrants little or no protection, it
follows that neither third-party publications nor insider leaks to the press
warrant much, if any, protection. Yet the more common position takes a mixed
approach - namely, government insiders who leak classified information war-
rant little or no constitutional protection, while third-party publishers who
publish leaked information must be strongly protected.39 This mixed approach
starts from the premise that classified information is speech that warrants full
protection when conveyed by one not in a position of trust with respect to it. Yet
that premise is joined by one or two other premises. One additional premise is
that persons who access classified information by virtue of an employment or
contractual relationship with the government are in positions of trust with
respect to that information. As such, they have waived much if not all of their
constitutional rights to convey it.40 The second premise is that the mixed
approach is a necessary, if inescapably chaotic, means to balance free speech
and free press interests against the executive's duty to guard national security.
Professor Geoffrey Stone articulated the latter premise in recent congressional
testimony:41
This [mixed approach] is surely a "disorderly situation," but it seems the best
possible solution. If we grant the government too much power to punish those
who disseminate information useful to public debate, then we risk too great a
sacrifice of public deliberation; if we grant the government too little power to
37. Id.
38. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
39. See supra note 7.
40. See supra note 8.
41. Elsewhere, Stone clarifies that he would strongly protect classified leaks that reveal illegal
government conduct. Geoffrey R. Stone, Secrecy and Self-Government, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81, 91
(2011); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press, I HARV. L. & Poe'Y
Rev. 185, 195-197 (2007) (making the same point in substantially more detail).
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control confidentiality "at the source," then we risk too great a sacrifice of
secrecy and government efficiency. The solution is thus to reconcile the
opposing values of secrecy and accountability by guaranteeing both a strong
authority of the government to prohibit leaks and an expansive right of
other[s] to disseminate them.42
2. Doctrinal Support for According Insiders Little or No Protection
As we have seen, there is very little case law directly addressing leaker
protections from prosecution. Yet in the one such federal appellate court opinion
and in cases involving pre-publication review, the concept of waiver figures
prominently. In Morison, Judge Russell's opinion for the Court emphasized that
Morison had committed theft by stealing classified photographs to which he had
special access as a security-cleared employee of the Navy. The opinion also
stressed that Morison had agreed, as a condition of his employment and security
clearance, not to disclose classified information without authorization.43 And in
Snepp, the Supreme Court deemed Snepp's employment relationship with the
CIA to have "involved an extremely high degree of trust."44 The trust relation-
ship was made explicit, said the Court, in the pre-publication-review agreement
that Snepp signed.45 Most importantly, the Court stressed that the remedy it
approved - a constructive trust on Snepp's proceeds - was perfectly tailored to
Snepp's "fiduciary and contractual" breaches.46
Waiver themes invoked by courts in other contexts also have been drawn
upon by courts addressing classified information leaks. In the 2009 decision
Wilson v. CIA, the Second Circuit upheld Valerie Plame Wilson's pre-
publication agreement with the CIA as applied to stop the publication of
information that, while public knowledge, remained classified.47 In so holding,
the Court cited the 1995 case of United States v. Aguilar.48 In Aguilar, the
Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a federal judge for revealing the fact of
42. Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by Wikileaks, Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 19-20 (2010) (statement of Geoffrey R. Stone, Professor and
Former Dean, University of Chicago Law School). Professor Stone cited the work of Alexander Bickel,
who first invoked the phrase "disorderly situation" to make a very closely related point. ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 80 (1975). Bickel did not spell out his view on the prosecution of
government leakers in particular. He did, however, embrace the general proposition that "government
may guard mightily against ... leaks, and yet must suffer them if they occur." He endorsed, in short, an
"adversary game between press and government," although he did not specify whether leaker prosecu-
tions are among the legitimate means by which the government may "guard mightily against... leaks."
Id. at 80; see also Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, An Informing Press: The Search for a
Constitutional Principle, 68 CAL. L. REV. 482, 512-515 (1980) (endorsing Bickel's notion of a "contest"
between government and press, though without specifying the place of leaker prosecutions in the
contest).
43. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1068-1069.
44. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510.
45. Id. at 510-511.
46. Id. at 515-516.
47. Wilson v. CIA, 586 F.3d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 2009).
48. Id.
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a wiretap order to its subject. 49 The Wilson Court cited Aguilar for the proposi-
tion that:
when a government employee "voluntarily assume[s] a duty of confidentiality,
governmental restrictions on disclosure are not subject to the same stringent
standards that would apply to efforts to impose restrictions on unwilling
members of the public."5 °
And in 2011, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, rejecting
Stephen Kim's motion to dismiss his criminal leak prosecution, cited the D.C.
Circuit's decision in Boehner v. McDermott.5 1 Specifically, it cited the Boehner
court's view that pursuant to Aguilar, "those who accept positions of trust
involving a duty not to disclose information they lawfully acquire while perform-
ing their responsibilities have no First Amendment right to disclose that informa-
tion.,,52
Some commentators deem another line of judicial precedent - that involving
the free speech protections due government employees against termination or
other employment-based discipline - bad news for leakers seeking protection
from prosecution. In these cases - sometimes referred to as the Pickering line of
cases after the earliest in the series, Pickering v. Board of Education - the Court
established that government employees sometimes are protected from being
fired or disciplined for speech on matters of public concern. To determine
whether an employee may be punished in a given case, courts must balance "the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the effi-
ciency of the public services it performs through its employees." 53 In the 2006
case of Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court clarified that these protections do not
apply to speech "made pursuant to the employee's official duties.",54 At least
one academic commentator interprets Garcetti to mean that employees who leak
classified information have no First Amendment protection from prosecution
because they accessed the information as a result of their government employ-
ment.5 5 Another commentator concludes that the Pickering balance applies
to classified information leaks, but that the result is a broad government
leeway to punish leaks through discharge or criminal prosecution.56 The latter
49. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 595, 605-606 (1995).
50. Wilson, 586 F.3d at 183.
51. United States v. Kim, 808 F. Supp. 2d 44, 57 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Boehner v. McDermott,
484 F.3d 573, 579 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
52. Id.
53. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968)).
54. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006). See also id. at 418-423.
55. Vladeck, supra note 9, at 1534-1535, 1540-1541.
56. Stone, Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press, supra note 41, at 195.
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commentator does, however, consider leaks that reveal illegal government
conduct protected under Pickering balancing.57
II. THE CASE FOR SUBSTANTIALLY PROTECTING LEAKERS FROM PROSECUTION
A. Constitutional Text, Structure, and Principle
This section counters, as a matter of constitutional first principle, the major
arguments against leaker protections. The constitutional cases for protecting
third-party publishers and for protecting insider leakers are deeply intertwined.
For instance, the executive branch is deliberately structured to help ensure that
the public will learn of executive abuses and incompetence. One aspect of this
design is an appointments process meant to filter out sycophants who would
conspire to hide presidential misdoings. As this example reflects, constitutional
mechanisms for funneling important inside information to the public cannot so
neatly be separated from protections for the very insiders who leak such
information against their superiors' wishes. This section thus explains why both
classified speech generally, and leaked information from government insiders
about national security and public policy in particular, presumptively merit
robust constitutional protections.
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press. '58 Given the vagueness of the phrase
"freedom of speech," commentators and courts long have sought to discern its
underlying principles and apply them to concrete cases. 59 Notwithstanding the
occasional exception, 60 even self-described originalists generally do not target
the free speech or press clauses as vessels for narrow founding era expectations
as to how the clauses would be applied. Indeed, the view - which is prominent
and longstanding though by no means undisputed - that the clauses originally
57. Id. ("Applying the Pickering standard, the government has no legitimate interest in keeping
secret its own illegality, and the public has a compelling interest in the disclosure of such information").
Similarly, some lower court opinions deem Snepp to have implicitly applied Pickering balancing to
classified information leaks. See, e.g., Weaver v. United States Information Agency, 87 F.3d 1429,
1439-1443 (D.C. Cir. 1996); id. at 1439-1440 (citing Zook v. Brown, 865 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1989)).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
59. The literature is vast. A small but eclectic sampling of works in this area include, e.g., STEVEN H.
SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 521 (1977); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L. J. 1 (1971); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877 (1963); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982); Seana
Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 283 (2011);
Susan H. Williams, Feminist Jurisprudence and Free Speech Theory, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1563 (1994).
60. One notable exception is found in a recent dissenting opinion by Justice Thomas. There, he
invoked the founders' child-rearing practices to conclude that the First Amendment today protects
neither the right of minors to see or hear speech that their parents do not wish for them nor the right of
speakers to convey such speech to minors. See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n., 131 S.Ct. 2729,
2751-2761 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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were meant predominantly to protect against prior restraints,6' has had no
directly restrictive impact on modem free speech doctrine or commentary.62
Instead, arguments about free speech long have centered on debates over the
broad principle or principles underlying that clause and how to apply the same.
The quest to identify free speech principles has captured the attention of
countless scholars over many decades and engendered much disagreement.
Nonetheless, there is at least one point of virtual unanimity: whatever else the
freedom of speech may encompass, it undoubtedly includes a right to convey
information and opinion about government. 63 This point also encompasses -
sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly - the notion that such communi-
cations are means to oversee and check government.64
Protecting speech that helps to facilitate and check self-government indeed is
a central purpose of the free speech and free press clauses from the perspectives
of constitutional structure and principle more broadly. The speech and press
clauses naturally should be read in conjunction with the larger document of
which they form a part.65 As I detail in other work, a major feature of that
document's separated powers system is its scheme for containing executive
energy.66 While the executive is designed to have energetic capacities - includ-
ing a capacity to keep secrets - it is also structured to maximize the chances that
abuses of those capacities will be detected and remedied. Indeed, Federalist
proponents of ratification routinely assured Americans that the fact of a single
President - as opposed to a multi-member body - would enable the President to
act with energy while facilitating the ready detection of his misdeeds. For
example, in the same essay of The Federalist in which Alexander
61. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-714 (193 1) (statement of this conventional view); see
JEFFREY A. SMrrH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM 164 (1988) (description and rejection of the strongest
version of this view - that the free press clause "meant freedom only from ... prior restraint"); see also
id. at 4-13.
62. To the extent that the view influences doctrine, it does so by contributing to the very strong
presumption against prior restraints on speech. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-716 (1931). It
has not, however, resulted directly in limits on protections against other types of restrictions.
63. See supra note 35. Each of these works deems such speech either central to the First Amend-
ment's purpose, or encompassed in a broader free speech value or set of values.
64. The seminal work on the checking value in First Amendment theory is Professor Blasi's article
of that title. See Blasi, supra note 59. In addition to detailing the checking value, the article explores the
value's relationship to other major theories of free speech value. Id. at 548, 553-554, 557-565.
65. This would be true in any event, but it is particularly so in light of the historical backdrop against
which the First Amendment was created. Federalists had issued assurances that Congress lacked the
power, under Article I of the original Constitution, to regulate speech or the press. Anti-Federalists
disputed that these freedoms were adequately protected by Article I and insisted that the Constitution be
revised to protect them explicitly. There thus was a consensus in debates on the original document that
the document either did or must protect speech and press. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, The Origins of
the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455,467-475 (1983).
66. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability and Administrative Structure, 45 WtLLAMETrE L. REV.
607, 623-629, 632-634 (2009); Heidi Kitrosser, Macro-Transparency as Structural Directive: A Look at
the NSA Surveillance Controversy, 91 MtNN. L. REV. 1163, 1173-1178 (2007).
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Hamilton boasted of a single President's energetic capacities, Hamilton has-
tened to add that such unity gives "the people.., the opportunity of discovering
with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order
either to their removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which
admit of it."'67 Similarly, a ratification proponent wrote in the Virginia Indepen-
dent Chronicle that "secrecy and dispatch" will attach to the unitary presidential
office and also championed the fact that "[t]he United States are the scrutinizing
spectators of [the President's] conduct, and he will, always, be the distinguished
object of political jealousy.,68 The free speech and free press clauses fit like
puzzle pieces into this constitutional design. Without broad freedoms to gather
and disseminate information from within the executive branch, the larger
structure would crumble.
That the First Amendment serves in part to contain executive power is in no
way undermined by its framing as a directive to Congress. A core means by
which the Constitution contains executive energy is that it grants the lawmaking
power to Congress alone.69 It does not accord the President prerogatives to
restrain speech unilaterally. It thus would have been nonsensical for the First
Amendment to admonish the President to "make no law... ." Indeed, Anti-
Federalists made clear their fears that Congress would pass speech-restrictive
laws absent textual guarantees of free speech and a free press.7 ° Such fears
would not have applied to the President, who had no lawmaking power.
The history underlying the speech and press clauses confirms their role in
supporting the larger constitutional structure. For example, the American colo-
nists were deeply influenced by a series of British essays published in the 1720s
under the pseudonym "Cato." In Essay Number 15, Cato wrote:
Whoever would overthrow the Liberty of a Nation must begin by subduing
the Freeness of Speech; a thing terrible to publick Traytors.
That Men ought to speak well of their Governours, is true, while their
Governours deserve to be well spoken of, but to do publick Mischief without
Hearing of it is only the Prerogative and Felicity of Tyranny ....
Freedom of Speech is the great Bulwark of Liberty; they prosper and Die
together ... . Freedom of Speech therefore being of such infinite importance
to the Preservation of Liberty; every one who loves liberty ought to encourage
Freedom of Speech.7 '
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 348 (Alexander Hamilton) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008).
68. 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 245 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988) (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., Kitrosser, Macro-Transparency, supra note 66, at 1168-1169.
70. See supra note 41.
71. Blasi, supra note 59, at 530.
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Cato's "bulwark of liberty" language was repeated often by Americans both
before and after the Revolution in explaining the necessity of a free press72 and
free speech. 73 Eighteenth-century Americans also consumed, penned, and circu-
lated similar sentiments.74 For instance, shortly before the Revolution, "hoping
to make allies of the settlers in Quebec, [the Continental Congress] approved a
declaration explaining to the northern neighbors the goals of the American
endeavor:
The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of the press. The
importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science, moral-
ity, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administra-
tion of Government, in its ready communication of thoughts between subjects,
and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive
officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of
conducting affairs.75
In the constitutional ratification process, the role of speech and press free-
doms as pillars of democracy and the rule of law were acknowledged alike by
Federalists - who insisted that the original Constitution implicitly protected
speech and press - and Anti-Federalists - who demanded the explicit textual
protection that became the First Amendment.76 Those who went on to "draft[]
the First Amendment," like "their mentors ... placed great emphasis on the role
free expression can play in guarding against breaches of trust by public offi-
cials."7 7 In short, there was no dispute among members of the founding
generation that government oversight was among the most important ends of
free speech and a free press.
The First Amendment's promise would be empty indeed if its protections did
not extend to information that the President wishes to keep secret. This includes
information from government insiders, who alone are structurally situated to
reveal it. Indeed, Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike, in the framing and
ratification debates, deemed it crucial that the presidential office be designed to
prevent insiders from hiding executive misconduct. Federalists boasted that by
declining to annex a council to the President through Article II, they had
deprived the President of a group that would eagerly do his bidding and hide his
72. Some recent scholarship concludes that as a matter of original meaning, "the press" referred to
the printing press, which was the only technology of the time whereby the written word could be
disseminated en masse. In England, control of this technology had been an extremely effective form of
censorship. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or the Press as a
Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 459, 462 (2011); Edward Lee, Freedom
of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REV. 309, 316, 328-330, 339-352 (2008).
73. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 65 at 463, 473, 478, 491-493 (for reference to American uses of
the "bulwark of liberty" language).
74. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 59 at 530-535.
75. Anderson, supra note 65, at 463-464.
76. Id. at 467-475, 490-491.
77. Blasi, supra note 59, at 527.
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secrets. Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, insisted that the department heads
would form a de facto council to play a sycophantic, secret-keeping role on the
President's behalf.
One constitutional supporter urged that: "The executive power is better to be
trusted when it has no screen. Sir, we have a responsibility in the person of our
President; he cannot act improperly, and hide either his negligence, or inatten-
tion; he cannot roll upon any other person the weight of his criminality. ' T
Another observed:
It has ... been objected, that a Council of State ought to have been assigned
the President. The want of it, is, in my apprehension, a perfection rather than a
blemish. What purpose would such a Council answer, but that of diminishing,
or annihilating the responsibility annexed to the character of the President.
From the superiority of his talents, or the superior dignity of his place, he
would probably acquire an undue influence over, and might induce a majority
of them to advise measures injurious to the welfare of the States, at the same
time that he would have the means of sheltering himself from impeachment,
under that majority.79
Alexander Hamilton went further, boasting that the President not only would
lack a council behind which to hide, but that his appointed subordinates would
be unlikely to shield his bad acts. Appointees selected by the President and a
council, Hamilton reasoned, would "possess[] the necessary insignificance and
pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments of [the President's] plea-
sure." 80 Yet this unhappy state of affairs would far less likely follow, he
predicted, from appointments contingent on Senate approval.
Anti-Federalist George Mason argued, on the other hand, that:
The President of the United States has no Constitutional Council (a thing
unknown in any safe and regular government) he will therefore be unsup-
ported by proper information and advice; and will generally be directed by
Minions and Favourites... or a Council of State will grow out of the princi-
pal officers of the great departments; the worst and most dangerous of all
ingredients for such a Council, in a free country; for they may be induced to
join in any dangerous or oppressive measures, to shelter themselves, and
prevent an inquiry into their own misconduct in office.81
Another council proponent evinced similar concerns, noting that "the supreme
executive powers ought to have been placed in the president, with a small
78. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONsTrrUTION 635 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
79. Id. at 44.
80. THE FEDERALIST No. 76 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 67, at 373.
81. Supra note 68, at 44.
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independent council made personally responsible for every appointment to
office or other act, by having their opinions recorded. 82
While the founders disagreed on the means to ensure executive accountability
and to protect against self-serving secrecy, all agreed that these were crucial
goals. Their shared idea - that the executive's energetic capacities must be
checked through internal and external mechanisms to bring to light executive
misbehavior - is manifest not only in historical materials, but throughout the
text and structure of Articles I and II of the Constitution.83
It is deeply antithetical to these constitutional principles for the executive to
have free reign to muzzle employees or third parties simply by deeming
categories of information off limits. This is not to say that there are no
countervailing factors that favor executive information control. It is only to say
that the latter are not the only values in the constitutional balance. Of equal
constitutional weight is the value of information and informed opinion from
government insiders.
B. Theory Meets Reality: The Classification System
Of course, it is not enough to recite constitutional principles in the abstract.
Ultimately, these abstractions must be applied to facts in the real world. This
brings us back to the information classification system. Specifically, it brings us
to the question of whether classification justifies a weaker level of First Amend-
ment protection than constitutional principles would otherwise dictate for speech
involving inside information about government. The answer is no, for reasons
both logical and empirical. Logically, free speech principles demand that execu-
tive inclinations to punish speech about the executive be checked by forces
independent of the executive. Nor does it suffice to leave the extent of such
checks to Congress's discretion. After all, the First Amendment explicitly limits
Congress's lawmaking power in the realms of speech and press. Beyond the
obvious textual point, statutes that deem speech punishable in part or in whole
for its classified status, where classification decisions are matters of executive
discretion, effectively place the First Amendment status of government informa-
tion in the hands of the executive.
Experience confirms that the political branches are woefully inadequate at
self-policing against overreach in the classification system. The President largely
determines classification policy unilaterally, through executive orders that can
change between administrations.84 Furthermore, the application of these broad
policies is delegated to an enormous number of government employees and
82. Supra note 78, at 635.
83. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Macro-Transparency at 1167-1168; see also HEIDI KITROSSER, AccouNT-
ABiLITY: TRANSPARENCY, EXECUTnVE POWER, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2013) (Chapter 3).
84. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROTECING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, S. Doc.
No. 105-2, at 5, 11-13, 15 (1997) [hereafter S.Doc. No. 105-2]; HAROLD C. RELYEA, SECuRITY CLASSIFIED
AND CONTROLLED INFORMATION: HISTORY, STATUS AND EMERGING MANAGEMENT ISSUES 2-5 (2007); ARrHuR
M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 338-341 (1973). A few discrete categories of information
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contractors. At present, well over a million persons have such authority. Of
these, 2,378 persons had "original classification" authority as of the end of fiscal
year 2010.85 The average number of original classifiers between fiscal years
1980 and 2008 was 5,400.86 Original classifiers are "authorized to determine
what information, if disclosed without authorization, could reasonably be ex-
pected to cause damage to national security.",87 Additionally, original classifiers
create classification guides. Such guides are instructions for "derivative classifi-
ers." A guide "is a set of instructions ... which identifies elements of informa-
tion regarding a specific subject that must be classified and establishes the level
and duration of classification for each such element.",88 The remaining several
million persons with classification authority are derivative classifiers.89 In theory,
derivative classifiers lack policy discretion because their decisions are derived
from original classification decisions.90 In actuality, determining what is deriva-
tive of already classified information- short of exact replicas of the latter -
itself entails discretion. This is particularly so where the basis for derivative
classification is the following of classification guides.
Given this background, it is not surprising that experts across the political
spectrum long have acknowledged rampant overclassification. J. William Leon-
ard, the former director of the Information Security Oversight Office in the
George W. Bush administration, acknowledges a problem of "excessive classifi-
cation." Leonard says that he has "seen information classified that [he's] also
seen published in third-grade textbooks." 9' At a 2004 congressional hearing,
both Leonard and Carol A. Haave, then the Defense Department's Undersecre-
tary for Intelligence, estimated that "probably about half of all classified informa-
tion is overclassified. '' 92 In 1991, Rodney B. McDaniel, who had been Executive
Secretary of the National Security Council in the Reagan administration, esti-
are classified by statute. See, e.g., Nathan Brooks, The Protection of Classified Information: The Legal
Framework (Cong. Research Serv. RS21900), Aug. 5, 2004, at 2 n.7.
85. INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2010 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 1 (2011) [hereinafter ISOO 2010
Report].
86. INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2009 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 4 (2010) [hereinafter ISOO 2009
Report]; see also ISOO 2010 Report, supra note 85, at 2, 4-5 (discussing recent downward trend in
number of original classification authorities).
87. ISOO 2010 ISOO Report, supra note 85, at 4.
88. Id. at 8.
89. Precise numbers of derivative classifiers are not recorded given the fluid means by which they
are designated. A 1997 Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy
estimated that "three million government and industry employees ... have the ability to mark informa-
tion as classified." S.Doc. No. 105-2, supra note 84, at 31.
90. ISOO 2010 Report, supra note 85, at 8.
91. Scott Shane, Since 2001, Sharp Increase in the Number of Documents Classified by the
Government, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, at Al.
92. Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by Wikileaks, Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 27 (2010) (statement of Abbe D. Lowell, Partner, McDermott
Will & Emery LLP) (emphasis in original) (citing Too Many Secrets: Overclassification as a Barrier to
Critical Information Sharing, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Security, Emerging Threats and
Int'l Relations, Comm. on Gov 't Reform, 108th Cong. 82-83 (2004)).
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mated that "only 10% of classification was for 'legitimate protection of se-
crets.' ' 93 Former New Jersey governor and 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas
Kean has said that "three-quarters of the classified material [I] reviewed for the
[9/11] Commission should not have been classified in the first place." 94 The
Moynihan Commission, led by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan in the 1990s
to study government secrecy, observed in its 1997 report that "[t]he classifica-
tion system ... is used too often to deny the public an understanding of the
policymaking process, rather than for the necessary protection of intelligence
activities and other highly sensitive matters. 95 And Erwin N. Griswold, former
Solicitor General under President Richard M. Nixon, deemed it "apparent to any
person who has considerable experience with classified material that there is
massive overclassification and that the principal concern of the classifiers is not
with national security, but rather with governmental embarrassment of one sort
or another."96 Statistics give an additional sense of the classification system's
reach. As noted above, there presently are well over a million persons with
some form of classification authority.97 The number of new classification deci-
sions - including combined original and derivative decisions to classify - aver-
aged 16.1 million per year from FY 1996 through FY 2009.98
Coupled with over-classification is the widespread practice of selective,
"authorized" leaking from the top.99 The White House orchestrates leaks so
frequently as to have spawned the well worn joke that "the ship of state is the
only vessel that leaks from the top."' '° By selectively leaking only self-serving
information, an administration can steer public sentiment in its favor. Administra-
tions also leak information as "trial balloons to test public reaction to policy
options without formally committing to them."' 1 Theodore Roosevelt is cred-
93. Id. at 84 (statement of Thomas S. Blanton, National Security Archive, George Washington
University) (citing statement of Rodney McDaniel).
94. 108 CONG. REc. S9714 (2004).
95. S. Doc. No. 105-2, supra note 84, at xxi.
96. Erwin N. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25.
97. Supra note 89.
98. ISOO 2009 Report, supra note 86, at 9. For the classification statistics from FY 2010 and
comparisons between them and earlier years' numbers, see ISOO 2010 Report, supra note 85, at 8-12.
99. See, e.g., Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by Wikileaks, Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 48, 51 (2010) (testimony of Gabriel Schoenfeld,
Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute) (discussing common practice of authorized leaking); The
Espionage Statutes: A Look Back and a Look Forward, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism and
Homeland Security, I11th Cong. 7, 10-11, 14 (statement and testimony of Jeffrey H. Smith, Partner,
Arnold and Porter) (same).
100. This quote has been attributed to journalist James Reston. See David E. Rosenbaum, First a
Leak, Then a Predictable Pattern, N.Y.TtEs, Oct. 3, 2003, at A16.
101. Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Role of News Leaks in Governance and the Law of Journalists'
Confidentiality, 1795-2005, 43 SAN DtEo L. REv. 425, 444 (2006) (describing Theodore Roosevelt's
use of this strategy); see also Papandrea, supra note 12, at 251-252 (describing the ubiquity of and
strategies behind authorized leaks from the top); William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists,
Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 57 AM. U. L. REv. 1453, 1469-1470 (2008) (same).
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ited as the original master of strategic leaking from the White House.10 2 Yet
Roosevelt was hardly the last to employ this technique. The four most recent
books of journalist Bob Woodward alone are "filled with classified information
that [Woodward] could only have received from the top of the government" in
the Obama and George W. Bush administrations.1 0 3 Given the ubiquity of leaks
from the top and the enormous number of secrets kept by the government,
"leaks of classified information, including classified national security informa-
tion, have become one of the primary ways the government communicates
information to the public."' 4
Given the twin realities of massive over-classification and widespread selec-
tive leaks from the top, a broad executive discretion to prosecute classified
information leaks is a powerful means for the executive - both through actual
prosecutions and through fear of the same - to manipulate information flow.
Such discretion can generate a deeply slanted chilling effect. Those who leak
information that paints an administration in a bad light have much to fear in an
environment where prosecutions occur or are threatened regularly.
These realities complement the theoretical problems of any scheme that
enables the executive to qualify First Amendment protections for speech about
itself. Such a scheme is profoundly in tension with a constitutional structure
designed to ensure executive accountability and to do so partly through free
speech and a free press.
C. Confronting the Doctrine
Leakers who seek constitutional protection must, of course, confront judicial
precedent. As we have seen, there are aspects of existing doctrine that bode
poorly for leakers. Leakers can respond to these doctrinal elements with the
following four points. First, much of the precedent can be limited to the facts.
For example, despite some sweeping statements in the Fourth Circuit's opinion
for the Court in Morison, two of the three panel judges indicated that some
classified leak prosecutions might raise serious First Amendment problems.
This argument is elaborated in C. 1. below. Second, where courts have leeway
either to depart from or narrowly interpret precedent - for example, the Fourth
Circuit could overrule Morison, courts outside of the Fourth Circuit could
choose not to follow it, and district courts within the Fourth Circuit could
decline to extend it beyond its facts - courts should do so. They should do so
partly in light of the constitutional arguments from first principles articulated
above. Additionally, they should do so in light of the third point, which is that a
102. See, e.g., Kielbowicz, supra note 101, at 444; Papandrea, supra note 12, at 236.
103. Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer, NEW YORKER, May 23, 2011, 46, 57 (quoting Jack Goldsmith);
see also Michael Isikoff, "Double Standard" in White House Leak Inquiries?, NBCNEWS.coM (Oct.
18, 2012), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.conid/39693850/ns/us-news-security; Jack Goldsmith,
Classified Information in Woodward's "Obama's Wars," LAWFARE (Sept. 29, 2010), available at
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/09/classified-information-in-woodwards-obama's-wars/.
104. Papandrea, supra note 12, at 236.
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wide swath of First Amendment precedent itself comports with the arguments
from first principles. This third point is addressed in C.2 below. Fourth and
finally, leakers and publishers at minimum should argue that the political
branches - both Congress in passing legislation and the executive branch in
exercising prosecutorial discretion - ought to act in a manner consistent with
constitutional first principles and with the protective elements of judicial doc-
trine, as described below in C.2.
1. The Limits of Anti-Leaker Aspects of Doctrine
a. The Limits of Doctrinal Suggestions to the Effect that Classified Speech
Deserves Little Protection
As we have seen, there is an important strain of thought in the case law to the
effect that classified information deserves far less protection than unclassified
speech. The limited doctrinal reach of this reasoning stems partly from its
scarcity. Many questions simply have not been decided by any federal court, or
have been decided only by a single federal appellate court. Furthermore, of the
few relevant judicial opinions, some are careful to note that greater protections
might be warranted under different circumstances. 
0 5
As we have seen, the only federal appellate court to rule directly on the
constitutionality of prosecuting classified leaks or publications was the Fourth
Circuit in United States v. Morison. There, the court considered Samuel Mori-
son's prosecution for leaking classified satellite photos to the press.' 0 6 Judge
Russell's opinion for the court contained statements to the effect that the case
involved pure theft and implicated no First Amendment rights. 10 7 Nonetheless,
two of the three panel judges concurred separately to make clear their view that
the prosecution did implicate the First Amendment. 0 8 And while both concur-
ring judges embraced a deferential role for the judiciary, the extent of deference
prescribed by either -and thus agreed upon by a majority of the Morison
court - is unclear. Concurring Judge Wilkinson suggested that very strong
deference is in order, as the alternative "would be grave."' 9 Yet he also
expressed confidence that sources who reveal very important stories, such as
"'corruption, scandal, and incompetence in the defense establishment,"' were
unlikely to be prosecuted or convicted, and that if they were, the situation could
be "cured through case-by-case [judicial] analysis of the fact situations."" 0
Concurring Judge Phillips endorsed "Judge Wilkinson's ... view that the First
Amendment issues raised by Morison are real and substantial and require the
105. See, e.g., infra notes 109-112.
106. See Morison, 844 F.2d at 1060.
107. Id. at 1077.
108. Id. at 1080-1081 (Wilkinson, J., concurring); id. at 1085-1086 (Phillips, J., concurring)
109. Morison, 844 F2d at 1083 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 1084.
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serious attention which his concurring opinion then gives them."'  He also
accepted Judge Wilkinson's "general estimate" that leaks exposing important
news will not be punished, deeming it "the critical judicial determination forced
by the First Amendment arguments advanced in this case."
' 112
To be sure, the Morison court overall was exceedingly deferential to broad
statutory prosecution authorizations as applied to classified information leaks.
This is deeply problematic from the perspective of free speech theory, particu-
larly given the realities of over-classification and selective leaking from the top.
Nonetheless, the concurring statements in Morison of two of the three judges
leave room, however narrow, for case-by-case arguments to the effect that some
prosecuted speech is of such high value as to warrant tougher judicial scrutiny
than that accorded Morison. Similarly, recall that the District Court in Rosen, a
court within the Fourth Circuit, took a more protective view still of the
case-by-case fact-finding demanded where third parties are prosecuted for
publishing classified information. 
13
While no Supreme Court precedent directly addresses classified speech pros-
ecutions, some do, as we have seen, contain reasoning that could be deemed
dismissive of any First Amendment concerns about the same. 1 14 Yet there are
forceful reasons against extending such cases beyond their facts. As for Penta-
gon Papers, it would be imprudent for courts to extrapolate very much from the
dissenting or concurring opinions. Prosecutions - of either leakers or the press -
simply were not at issue in the case. " 5 While this point alone counsels caution,
it is further warranted in light of the tremendous time pressure under which the
case was briefed, argued, and decided. As observed in Justice Harlan's dissent-
ing opinion:
Both the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit rendered judgment on June 23. The New
York Times' petition for certiorari, its motion for accelerated consideration
thereof, and its application for interim relief were filed in this Court on June
24 at about 11 a.m. The application of the United States for interim relief in
the Post case was also filed here on June 24 at about 7:15 p.m. This Court's
order setting a hearing before us on June 26 at 11 a.m., a course which I
joined only to avoid the possibility of even more peremptory action by the
Court, was issued less than 24 hours before. The record in the Post case was
filed with the Clerk shortly before 1 p.m. on June 25; the record in the Times
case did not arrive until 7 or 8 o'clock that same night. The briefs of the
parties were received less than two hours before argument on June 26.1 16
111. Id. at 1085 (Phillips, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 1086.
113. United States v. Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 703, 707 (2007).
114. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,421 (2006).
115. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
116. Id. at 753 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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The Court's decision, the concurrences, and the dissents all were issued just
four days after oral argument, on June 30, 1971. Given the sense of urgency
surrounding the case, one should hesitate to draw broad lessons from the
dissenters' view that the prior restraint should have been continued long enough
to permit thorough judicial consideration. The same caution applies to concur-
ring statements to the effect that a prior restraint was out of order, but that the
government might have other viable options, including criminal prosecution.117
Snepp, too, can and should be limited to its facts. It is true that the Snepp
Court emphasized the executive's prerogative to control classified information.
Given that prerogative and given Snepp's employment with the CIA, the Court
deemed a pre-publication review agreement a reasonable and constitutional
means for the CIA to protect classified information. Yet much of the opinion's
force comes in its approval of the trial court's remedy for Snepp's breach of the
agreement. Specifically, the Court approved a constructive trust on the proceeds
of Snepp's book, which Snepp had failed to submit to the CIA for review. A
constructive trust, the court explained, is "the natural and customary conse-
quence of a breach of trust. It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief
to the dimensions of the wrong. ... [S]ince the remedy reaches only funds
attributable to the breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary
damages out of all proportion to his gain." ' 1 8 Snepp thus does not embrace an
unfettered executive discretion to control classified information or an unfettered
legislative discretion to authorize any means of control. To the contrary, it
leaves room for fact-sensitive analyses to determine whether a given punish-
ment for classified speech goes too far. 19
Furthermore, Snepp was rife with procedural irregularites. In his petition for
certiorari, Snepp had asked the Supreme Court to consider the constitutionality
of the injunctive and damages remedies upheld by the appellate court. The
government responded with a conditional cross-petition, asking the Court, if it
granted Snepp's certiorari petition, also to review the appellate court's rejection
of the constructive trust remedy that the trial court had approved. 20 The
Supreme Court's per curiam opinion focused on the constructive trust issue.
The Court's response to Snepp's First Amendment objections was shoe-homed
into a single footnote. Because the Court barely addressed the issues raised by
Snepp, the dissent argued that the Court had effectively denied Snepp's petition
117. Cf. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 11, at 361 ("A number of the Justices volunteered readings of
the espionage statutes in relation to hypothetical criminal proceedings against the publishers, reporters
and information sources involved, even though such questions had not been briefed, were dreadfully
difficult, and were quite unnecessary to a ruling about the injunction.").
118. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515-516 (1980).
119. See also Goldston, et al., supra note 9, at 441-442 (citing the case's unusual procedural posture
and "cursory attention to First Amendment questions" as an additional basis for caution in applying its
holding).
120. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 524-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Goldston, et al., supra note 9 at 442 n. 165;
Diane F. Orentlicher, Snepp v. United States: The CIA Secrecy Agreement and the First Amendment, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 662, 665 n.23 (1981).
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for certiorari and thus lacked jurisdiction over the case, given the conditional
nature of the government's cross-petition. 12 1 Moreover, the Court decided the
case without benefit of merits briefs or oral argument. 122 As Archibald Cox
wrote at the time, "One would have supposed that the extent of the govern-
ment's authority to silence its officials and employees and thereby deprive the
public of access to information about government activity was not too obvious
to deserve deliberate judicial consideration." 23
b. The Limits of the Waiver Theory in the Case Law
As we have seen, aspects of the case law also support a second basis to deny
leakers much if any First Amendment protection. This basis rests on the grounds
that government insiders effectively waive rights to disclose information that
they access through government employment or as a result of secrecy agree-
ments.
The limited reach of this proposition as it appears in two important
cases - Morison and Snepp - parallels the two cases' limits as they relate to the
argument against classified speech protections generally. As for Morison, the
Court's opinion - despite its sweeping rhetoric to the effect that Morison en-
gaged not in speech but in theft and a violation of his employment terms - again
must be viewed in light of the separate opinions of two of the three judges on
the panel. While those opinions too are broadly deferential to the executive,
they acknowledge that serious First Amendment issues are at stake and suggest
that Morison does not preclude future courts from taking into account the value
of particular leaks in assessing prosecutions. As for Snepp, the opinion's reach
is limited by its remedy-specific reasoning. The Snepp Court did deem a former
CIA employee to have waived his First Amendment rights when he agreed to
submit future writings to the CIA for pre-publication review so that the agency
could check for classified information. Yet an important feature of the Court's
reasoning was its attention to the tight fit between the remedy that it approved -
a constructive trust against book proceeds - and the nature of the contractual
breach at issue. Furthermore, Snepp's procedural irregularities independently
warrant caution in extending its holding beyond its facts.
Moving to other cases that provide some support for the waiver theory, it also
is too great a stretch to read language in Aguilar v. United States to mean that
government employees are fully unprotected in all contexts from revealing
information that they have agreed not to reveal. Recall that the Supreme Court
in Aguilar upheld a federal judge's conviction for revealing a wiretap order to
its subject. Citing Snepp, the Aguilar Court explained that "[a]s to one who
voluntarily assumed a duty of confidentiality, governmental restrictions on
121. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 524-525 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Archibald Cox, Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1,
9-10 (1980); Orentlicher, supra note 120, at 665 n.23.
123. Cox, supra note 122, at 9-10.
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disclosure are not subject to the same stringent standards that would apply to
efforts to impose restrictions on unwilling members of the public."' 24 This
statement tells us only that the voluntary commitment element is a factor that
lowers the level of constitutional protection relative to what it otherwise would
be. It does not mean that First Amendment protections fail to apply at all.
Indeed, the Aguilar Court stressed that the relevant statute targeted only disclo-
sures of wiretap orders or applications intended to impede the same.' 25 The
Court also cited the obvious state interests in preventing this narrow set of
disclosures. 126 To the extent that lower courts cite Aguilar for the broader
proposition that voluntary non-disclosure agreements erase a contracting party's
First Amendment rights, they misread it. Furthermore, to the extent that the U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and Second Circuits in particular
have cited Aguilar for this overly broad proposition, they have done so in a
manner unnecessary to their holdings and in cases limitable to their facts.
1 27
The Pickering line of cases should not be construed to bear negatively on
leakers' constitutional protections against prosecution. As with Snepp, the reason-
ing of the Pickering cases is tied closely to particular remedies. Throughout the
latter precedents, the Supreme Court considers government's discretion to act as
an employer to discipline its employees - that is, to fire or demote them - for
their speech. The Court engages in case-by-case balancing between "the inter-
ests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the effi-
124. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 606 (1995).
125. Id. at 602.
126. Id. at 605-06.
127. In Wilson v. CIA, the Second Circuit correctly cited Aguilar's limited statement about the
relative protection accorded speakers who voluntarily take on non-disclosure obligations. Wilson v.
CIA, 586 F.3d 171, 183 (2d Cir. 2009). It went on, however, to suggest the broader point that "once a
government employee signs an agreement not to disclose information properly classified pursuant to
executive order, that employee 'simply has no First Amendment right to publish' such information." Id.
at 183-184. For the latter point it relied on Snepp and other cases specific to the issue of pre-publication
review contractual enforcement. Id. at 183-186. Two years after Wilson, the D.C. Circuit framed
Aguilar's reasoning more broadly still. In Boehner v. McDermou, the D.C. Circuit wrote: "Aguilar
stands for the principle that those who accept positions of trust involving a duty not to disclose
information they lawfully acquire while performing their responsibilities have no First Amendment
right to disclose that information." Boehner, 484 F.3d 573, 579 (2007). The Boehner Court upheld a
damages award against U.S. Representative McDermott for disclosing an illegally obtained recording
of a conference call that took place among a group of other congresspersons. Id. at 575, 581. The court
explained that Representative McDermott, as a member of the House Ethics Committee investigating a
party to the phone call, had explicitly taken on special duties of confidentiality. Id. at 579-581. Boehner
can and should, however, be limited to its facts, which are not incompatible with the notion that
executive branch insiders who leak classified information merit a degree of First Amendment protec-
tion. Boehner's characterization of the Aguilar Court's reasoning is dicta, and it misstates the Aguilar
Court's limited position. See id. at 588-589 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Boehner majority's
reading of Aguilar on grounds similar to those advanced here). For its part, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia also erred in citing Boehner's mischaracterization of Aguilar to support its
own rejection of Stephen Kim's motion to dismiss his indictment for leaking classified information.
United States v. Kim, 808 F Supp. 2d 44, 57 (D.D.C. 2011).
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ciency of the public services it performs through its employees." 128 Underlying
the employer's side of the balance, then, is the Court's view that public
employers, like private ones, need discretion to deal with employee speech that
negatively impacts the workplace. To protect such discretion, the Garcetti Court
went so far as to deem the Pickering balancing test - and hence First Amend-
ment protections - inapplicable to employees disciplined for "statements [made]
pursuant to their official duties."'' 29 Such a limit was necessary, said the Court,
to avoid "constitutionaliz[ing] the employee grievance."' 130
The Pickering cases, in short, are concerned with the government's need for
discretion when it acts as an employer in disciplining or dismissing employ-
ees.'3 ' The deference that the cases give government employers to fire or
discipline employees for their speech - whether through the application of
Pickering balancing or through Garcetti's categorical exclusion of some speech
from protection - is not translatable to the realm of criminal punishment.
Finally, recall that at least one commentator reads Garcetti - which deemed
Pickering's protections inapplicable to speech "made pursuant to the employ-
ee's official duties" - to remove any First Amendment protections for classified
information leaks because leakers access such information through their employ-
ment. Even if we assume that Garcetti applies to criminal prosecutions, its
categorical exemption should not be construed so broadly. True, the Garcetti
Court stated that "[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a public
employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the
employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen."' 132 But the logic of Garcetti
on the whole - and of the earlier cases on which it builds - cuts against interpret-
ing the statement to preclude protection for information gleaned through govern-
ment employment. Rather, the statement is best read to mean that speech that is
itself part of one's job is not protected. The latter interpretation is tailored to the
Garcetti Court's goal to avoid "constitutionaliz[ing] the employee griev-
ance."' 1 33 The former interpretation, on the other hand, would dramatically
undercut a premise - cited throughout the Pickering cases and reiterated in
Garcetti itself - underlying the speech value side of the Pickering balance. That
is, government employees have special value to add to the public debate by
virtue of their inside knowledge, and the public has an important "interest in
128. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968)).
129. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
130. Id. at 420 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 154).
131. The cases, in other words, are about "managerial prerogative." See Rosenthal, Lawrence, The
Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 33, 43 (2008)
(deeming managerial prerogative "critical to the outcome in Garcetti").
132. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-422; see also Vladeck, supra note 9, at 1540 (citing this language and
interpreting it to preclude constitutional protection for leaking classified information).
133. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 154).
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receiving [their] well-informed views."'1 34 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit in Wilson v.
CIA, which involved Valerie Plame Wilson's efforts to include some classified
information about her CIA service in a book, observed in a footnote that "[t]his
case does not implicate the concerns discussed in Garcetti."'135 Other federal
courts similarly have found Garcetti inapplicable to speech conducted outside
of one's employment responsibilities, even where the speech consists of informa-
tion learned through, and about, that employment. 1
36
2. The Doctrinal Seeds of an Affirmative Case for Protecting Leakers
Precedent also contains the seeds of an affirmative case for robustly protect-
ing leakers. Two foundational elements of the case are the notions that informa-
tion about government is of central importance under the First Amendment and
that suspicion is warranted when the government seeks to shield information
about itself from the public. Both ideas find substantial support in precedent. On
the first point, the Supreme Court has made clear that speech on matters of
public importance is at the heart of the First Amendment.' 37 Such speech not
only benefits speakers, but is vital to the constitutional system. If elections and
inter-branch checks and balances are to be more than mere facades, the people
must have opportunities to learn and convey information and debate ideas., 38
Expounding on these points, the Court has observed:
The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution
embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters
of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.
The exigencies of the colonial period and the efforts to secure freedom from
oppressive administration developed a broadened conception of these liberties
as adequate to supply the public need for information and education with
respect to the significant issues of the times.139
Appreciation for the value of speech about government and public affairs is
134. Id. at 419; see also id. at 419-420 (approvingly citing earlier cases to the effect that government
employees are especially well qualified to comment on matters that pertain to their employment).
135. Wilson v. CIA, 586 E3d 171, 185 n.15 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Lawrence Rosenthal, The
Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FoRDHAM L. REv. 33, 63 n.99 (2008)
(agreeing that Garcetti does not preclude protection for classified information leaks); Morse, supra note
9, at 430.
136. See, e.g., Fairley v. Fermaint, 482 F.3d 897, 899, 902 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that testimony by
county jail guards as to knowledge of inmate abuse acquired on the job was not part of their
employment duties and thus not within Garcetti exemption); Pattee v. Ga. Ports Auth., 477 F. Supp. 2d
1253, 1257-1258, 1261 n.4 (S.D. Ga. 2006) (explaining that Georgia Port Police officer's whistle-
blowing e-mails containing information acquired on the job were not covered by the Garcetti exemp-
tion because they were not sent in the course of his employment).
137. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-271, 273-276 (1964).
138. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 101-102 (1940); Grossjean v. Am. Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233, 243, 249-250 (1936).
139. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 101-102.
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closely intertwined with fears that the government will abuse censorial powers
to single out speech that it dislikes, including that which it perceives to threaten
its comfort or credibility. As the material just quoted reflects, the Court recog-
nizes the very real risk - and long history - of such abuses as important factors
underlying its free speech jurisprudence. Fear of government abuse, combined
with recognition of speech's affirmative value, are manifest in doctrines de-
signed to limit government's discretion to punish speech for its content. Among
these doctrines is the "content distinction" rule, which amounts to a strong
presumption against laws or law enforcement based on the viewpoint, subject
matter, or communicative impact of speech. 4 0
Long experience also demonstrates the special risks posed where government
seeks to punish speech that ostensibly threatens to cause violence or harm
national security. From World War I through the early Cold War years, the Court
regularly upheld prosecutions for anti-war, communist, and socialist speech.
There is wide consensus in retrospect that the prosecutions were poorly justified
and that the Court unduly deferred to the government in upholding them. 141 The
Court appeared to have internalized these lessons by 1969, when it decided
Brandenburg v. Ohio.1 42 In Brandenburg, the Court announced that one cannot
constitutionally be punished for speech linked to terrorism or to other dangerous
activity unless the speech is intended to incite, and likely to incite, imminent,
lawless action. 143 The Brandenburg Court also made clear that the judiciary has
the final word in striking this balance.' 44
The Supreme Court's appreciation for the informing and deliberative func-
tions of speech and its wariness of government abuse are manifest further in the
Court's attentiveness to the chilling effect of speech restrictions. The Court has
repeatedly observed that free speech is harmed not only by unwarranted punish-
ments, but by the self-censorship of those who fear the same. 14 5 Speakers may
play it safe in the face of vague or far-reaching laws, saying nothing that risks
angering powerful members of society. Such reasoning was central to the
Supreme Court's opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan establishing strong
First Amendment protections for speakers accused of defaming public offi-
cials.' 4 6 The Court deemed it better for protections to be so strong that some
140. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, From Marshall McLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows: Communicative
Matter and the First Amendment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1339, 1339-1342, 1345-1349 (2002) (summarizing
the rule and citing cases, though noting that the Supreme Court does not always treat communicative
matter as content).
141. For discussions reflecting this consensus, see, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILoUs TIMES: FREE
SPEECH IN WARTIME 179-207, 403-411 (2004) and Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and
the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1166-1173
(1982).
142. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WoRT-Y TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 227-236
(Jamie Kalven ed., 1988) (discussing doctrinal evolution from Schenck through Brandenburg).
143. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
144. Id. at 447-449; see also Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842-844 (1978).
145. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
146. Id.
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defamatory speech will go unpunished, than so weak that "would-be critics of
official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism."
' 147
These aspects of precedent lend support not only to protecting classified
speech generally, but to protecting leakers in particular. A government em-
ployee, lacking the high-level political support of an authorized leaker or the
resources of many third-party publishers, is especially vulnerable to chilling
with respect to classified speech that high-level officials are likely to deem
unwelcome for its content.
The Pickering line of cases shines the most direct light on the unique
constitutional value of leaks from government insiders. In Garcetti, the Su-
preme Court explained that "the First Amendment interests at stake extend
beyond the individual speaker. The Court has acknowledged the importance of
promoting the public's interest in receiving the well-informed views of govern-
ment employees engaging in civic discussion."'' 48 Indeed, public employees can
make uniquely important contributions to the speech marketplace precisely
because of knowledge gained through their work. In Pickering, the Court
observed that "[tleachers are, as a class, the members of a community most
likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the
operations of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they
be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory
dismissal."'
149
Such speech value does not disappear in the context of national security and
classified information. To the contrary, the very secrecy of these contexts
heightens the value of the information flow, even as the state's interests on the
other side of the balance may be heightened as well.
III. CALBRATING LEAKER PUNISHMENTS AND PROTECTIONS
A. The Problem With the Mixed Approach
To be sure, the government has a compelling interest in protecting informa-
tion that will harm national security if released. The executive branch also
requires leeway to control its employees and operations so that it may execute
the law effectively. But profound interests also counsel against excessive execu-
tive discretion to punish information leaks, and those interests too are deeply
grounded in the Constitution.
Perhaps the closest that we have seen to a resolution of this tension - primar-
ily among commentators, though also through indirect judicial suggestion - is a
mixed approach whereby third-party publishers and government insiders are
placed on opposite ends of the free speech spectrum. From this perspective, the
former are fully protected when they publish classified information, and they
147. Id.
148. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).
149. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968).
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cannot be punished unless publication is intended to, and likely does, create a
danger of imminent illegality. The default status for the latter, on the other hand,
is a complete lack of protection, although some exceptions might be established,
for example, when the leaker can prove that the leaked information concerned
illegal activity.
The mixed approach has a certain intuitive appeal. The tensions raised in the
classified leaks context arise not only from competing substantive interests, but
also from competing institutional roles and competencies. The mixed approach
hinges protection on one's institutional relationship to classified information,
that is, on whether one accessed the information through affiliation with the
institution charged to protect it, or from outside of that institution. The approach
thus appears, on the one hand, to support the constitutional and practical
interests of the executive by according it nearly full control over its own
operations and personnel. On the other hand, it leaves outsiders free to check
executive secrecy by exercising their speech and press rights.
Yet despite the validity of the mixed approach's core insight - that the
different institutional positions of leakers and third-party publishers are constitu-
tionally important - the approach is oversimplified and under-protects leakers as
a result. Its oversimplification - and resulting under-protection - occurs on two
levels. First, the approach overlooks the constitutional role of checks from
within the executive branch. As we have seen, internal checks - including
informational checks against secrecy abuses - are an important feature of the
constitutional scheme for the separation of powers. The First Amendment is
designed partly to support this scheme. Second, the mixed approach underesti-
mates the degree to which executive control of leakers can chill speech of
public importance, cut off news to third-party publishers, and upset the flow of
information among citizens.
Indeed, we are in unchartered territory at present, given the extraordinary
number of leaker prosecutions brought thus far in the Obama administration.
There are many reasons for this dramatic uptick. First, as I have explored
elsewhere, theories of strong presidential power increasingly are moving into
the mainstream, and these include theories to the effect that information ceases
to be speech once it is classified by the executive branch. 150 While many
assumed that these theories were outliers that would disappear with the George
W. Bush administration, the Obama administration in fact has had more politi-
cal leeway to implement these theories, albeit in different forms and with less
inflammatory rhetoric. 151 Second, political and legal developments of the past
150. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Supremely Opaque?: Accountability, Transparency, and Presidential
Supremacy, 5 ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 62, 66-68, 79-80 (2010); Heidi Kitrosser, National
Security and the Article H Shell Game, 26 CONST. COMM. 483, 483-486 (2010).
151. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMrrH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT 40 (2012) ("Because the Obama policies
played against type and (in some quarters of his party) against interest, they appeared more likely to be
a necessary response to a real terror threat and thus less worrisome from the perspective of presidential
aggrandizement than when the Bush administration embraced essentially the same policies.").
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several years have made the executive branch increasingly willing to subpoena
journalists to demand source information.' 5 2 Third, new investigative powers
and methods have opened new avenues for the Justice Department to track
down leakers, even without journalistic cooperation.'5 3
These explanations surely are not exhaustive. In any event, the reasons for
heightened executive boldness in pursuing leak prosecutions, while important
and instructive, are beside the immediate point. The immediate point is simply
this: It is faulty to assume that a constitutionally healthy information flow can
be maintained in the face of nearly unfettered executive discretion to classify
information and punish its leaking. Even if third-party publishers themselves
retain broad freedoms to publish such information, they cannot do so without
insider leaks. The "mixed approach" thus depends on executive restraint to
operate properly. Yet as a theoretical matter, the information flow necessary to
support constitutional checks and balances should not hinge on voluntary
executive restraint. As a practical matter, we may be witnessing the end of
executive restraint and the disintegration of any previously maintained balance.
B. Calibrating Leaker Protections and Punishments
Executive branch insiders thus occupy a constitutional position more compli-
cated than that reflected in the mixed approach. On the one hand, insiders are a
part of the executive branch's machinery. As such, they properly are subject to
executive control beyond that to which ordinary citizens are subject. The
executive should not be required to tolerate employees who actively undermine
the execution of the law. Nor must it support employees' use of government
resources and special access privileges to do so. At the same time, executive
branch insiders have a constitutional significance that is not exhausted by their
role as servants of the branch. They occupy another, equally important position
in the constitutional structure - that of potential checks on abuses or mistakes to
which they alone may be privy.
The constitutional balance between executive control and checks on the
executive thus cannot be satisfied by a scheme that grants the executive
complete or near complete control over classified information leaks. What is
called for is a more nuanced calibration of protections and allowable punish-
ments. The calibration should reflect two factors. First, it must be grounded
partly in the relationship between the employee's institutional role and the
152. See, e.g., Sandra Davidson, Leaks, Leakers, and Journalisis: Adding Historical Context to the
Age of Wikileaks, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENr. L. J. 27, 70-72 (2011); Laura Rozen, Hung Out To Try,
COLUM. JouRNALisM REV. 33, 33-35 (Jan. / Feb. 2009); William E. Lee, supra, note 101 at 1458-1459,
1471-1473 (2008).
153. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, A High-Tech War on Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at SR5; Michael
Isikoff, DOJ Gets Reporter's Phone, Credit Card Records, MSNBC.coM (Feb. 25, 2011), available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41787944/ns/us-news-security/t/doj-gets-reporters-phone-credit-card-
records-leak-probe/#.UDfees3VrJM; Samantha Fredrickson, Tapping into the Reporter's Notebook, 32
NEws, MEDIA & THE L. 10, 10-11 (2008).
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punishment sought by the government. Second, it must reflect a considered
balance between the constitutional value in deterring leaks and that in avoiding
over-deterrence of leaks.
For present purposes, three outcomes of this calibration warrant note. First,
classified leaks should be treated like other government employee speech when
employment sanctions such as dismissal or demotion are at issue. Under current
doctrine, this means that the Pickering balancing test should apply when
employees are disciplined for leaks. Second, the government must meet a
considerably higher threshold to impose criminal or civil, rather than employ-
ment-based administrative penalties. Third, courts should consider varying the
precise nature of the government's burden with the severity of the penalty
sought in the criminal or civil context. I propose that efforts to impose severe
sanctions - for example, prosecutions with the possibility of several years in
prison or potentially bankrupting monetary penalties - require a showing that
the leaker lacked an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the public
interest in disclosure outweighed identifiable national security harms. Efforts to
impose less severe sanctions - for instance, prosecutions that raise the possibil-
ity of little if any incarceration time - may warrant a lesser standard. I would
propose that the government in the latter cases be required to demonstrate that
the leaker lacked an objectively substantial basis to believe that the public
interest in disclosure outweighed identifiable national security harms.
In the context of employment-based, administrative sanctions, the govern-
ment's case for control is at its apex as a matter both of institutional position
and leaker incentives. As for institutional position, arguments that the govern-
ment needs control over its employees are most plausible when that control is
tied to employment. Arguments from the employment relationship become
more strained when the government seeks to step out of its employer role and
into its sovereign role to prosecute employees criminally or to impose civil
punishments. The institutional point also intersects with concerns over leaker
incentives. Certainly, a job loss, demotion, or security clearance loss can be
devastating. This is why the government must not have unfettered power to
impose such sanctions, given the free speech value in insider leaks. Yet employ-
ment sanctions may pale next to the prospect of a lengthy prison sentence or
bankrupting fines. The Pickering test - which accords the government substan-
tial but not unfettered discretion over employee leaks - thus strikes a fair
balance with respect to the government's power to impose employment-based
penalties. As a practical matter, the outcome of the Pickering test as applied to
classified information leaks may well result in a situation whereby the govern-
ment is free to impose employment sanctions for leaks of classified information
except where an employee exposes illegality or other fairly clear-cut wrongdo-
ing. 154
154. This point calls to mind Professor Stone's proposal that leaks of illegal conduct be shielded
from either employment-based or criminal punishment. See supra note 41. But see also infra text
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In the context of prosecution, the threshold for government success must be
considerably higher. As a matter of institutional position, the government as
employer is very differently situated from the government as prosecutor. In a
free society, government necessarily has far less control over persons qua
persons than it has over persons qua government employees. This translates to a
much narrower discretion on the government's part to prosecute its employees
under the criminal law than to punish them through the terms and conditions of
their employment. The need to strike a balance between under-deterring and
over-deterring leaks also militates in favor of a high prosecutorial burden. Even
with a high burden, the possibility of prosecution surely has a chilling effect, as
does the likelihood of employment-based repercussions.
Given the importance of calibrating penalties and punishments in this con-
text, it also is advisable for courts to consider varying the government's burden
with the severity of the offense charged and the associated penalties. Such
calibration is hardly unprecedented. This is particularly so in the free speech
context where speech value must be balanced against different types and levels
of harm, and where chilling effects complicate matters further. In the defama-
tion setting, for example, courts long have subjected plaintiffs to burdens that
vary with their status as private or public figures and with the types of damages
sought. 1
55
Finally, two additional points bear mention. First, plaintiffs' burdens in civil
damages actions against leakers ought generally to parallel those of the govern-
ment in criminal cases. 156 Thus, plaintiffs seeking punitive damages generally
should be subject to the higher burden of proof described above, while plaintiffs
seeking only actual damages generally should be subject to the lower burden of
proof. However, there may be factors that require more tailored analysis in
particular civil cases. Recall, for instance, the constructive trust at issue in
Snepp, and the Court's analysis linking that remedy to contractual breach.
Second, leakers should be categorically protected from criminal prosecution
or employment based sanctions for leaks that disclose illegal government
conduct. To be clear, such protection would not suffice were it leakers' only
constitutional shield. Controversy inevitably will surround questions of what is
"illegal," particularly insofar as administrations can be expected to argue that
accompanying notes 159-161 (explaining that such protection is necessary but not sufficient to satisfy
First Amendment concerns in the criminal prosecution context).
155. See, e.g., ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, § 11.3.5.2, Defama-
tion, 1008-1018 (2d ed. 2002) (summarizing these distinctions in defamation and libel law).
156. Cf N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) ("What a State may not constitution-
ally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel. The
fear of damage awards under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly
more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute."); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 74 (1964) (stating that the reasons for imposing a high burden on defamation plaintiffs in Sullivan
"apply with no less force merely because the remedy is criminal"). Thanks very much to Mary Rose
Papandrea for suggesting that I address the question of civil damages.
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some statutory violations are legal under Article 11.157 More fundamentally, such
protection, standing on its own, would misallocate the appropriate burdens.
Both constitutional reasoning and the reality of classification militate against
embedding into constitutional law the presumption that classified information
leaks are punishable unless they reveal particular categories of information,
such as illegal conduct. Rather, the centrality of speech about government to our
system, the risk of a chilling effect on speech, and well-justified fears that
government will abuse secrecy and censorial powers warrant broader-based
leaker protections. Nonetheless, the categorical permissibility of leaks about
illegal activity, while inadequate standing alone, is a useful supplement to the
other protective elements suggested above.
On this latter point, the defamation context again offers an instructive paral-
lel. The Supreme Court long has taken the positions both that "there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact" and that the First Amendment is
not satisfied by a mere defense of truth for persons accused of defamation.1
5 8
The Court has explained that, under a truth defense regime:
[W]ould-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their
criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact
true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense
of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider
of the unlawful zone." The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety
of public debate.1
59
In the context of classified information leaks, the argument for protections
beyond an "illegality defense" is even stronger. The risk of deterring leaks about
illegal activities roughly parallels the risk of chilling truthful speech in the
defamation context. Yet in the classified leaks setting, there is another, indepen-
dent basis for concern. That is the risk of stifling other valuable classified
speech, beyond that exposing illegality. As we have seen, much classified
speech, including but not limited to that revealing illegality, is of high value.
Furthermore, wide government discretion to punish classified speech generally
is a dangerous tool by which government can manipulate the flow of news and
information.
157. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Shell Game, supra note 150, at 483-486 (citing influence and
ubiquity of such "exclusivity" arguments).
158. Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 340-341 (1974). The Supreme Court did, however,
hedge on the question of falsity's value in a footnote in New York imes Co. v. Sullivan, where it quoted
John Stuart Mill to the effect that "Even a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable
contribution to public debate, since it brings about 'the clearer perception and livelier impression of
truth, produced by its collision with error."' Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 n.19.
159. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (internal citation omitted).
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C. Addressing Objections to Calibration
One might object to the very notion of calibrating First Amendment protec-
tions by the nature of the penalty that the government seeks to impose. An
objector might point out that First Amendment protections typically hinge on
what a restriction targets - whether, for instance, a law targets speech on the
basis of its content and whether that content falls into an unprotected speech
category - rather than the type of penalty imposed. He or she might deem it
unwise to stray from this approach. Calibration could prove unwieldy. Or it
might dilute speech protections, making judges more willing to approve restric-
tions than they otherwise would, so long as those restrictions are paired with
relatively light penalties.1 60
In responding to these concerns, it is useful to divide calibration into two
categories. The first category involves calibration based on the institutional
nature of the punishment. For our purposes, that means calibration based on
whether the government seeks to impose an administrative punishment in its
capacity as employer - such as to fire or demote - or whether it seeks to impose
a criminal or civil punishment in its capacity as sovereign. The second category
entails calibration based on a punishment's severity.
With respect to institutional calibration, there is a growing scholarly literature
that evaluates the extent to which courts do, and should, differentiate between
speech restrictions imposed on and within different types of institutions. 161 This
essay's focus, however, is solely on one such differentiation - that between
penalties imposed by the government as employer and those imposed by the
government as sovereign. The distinction is warranted for two reasons. First, it
is justified as a matter of constitutional theory. As elaborated earlier, leakers
occupy two very different roles in the constitutional framework from the
perspectives of both separation of powers and free speech theory. In their role as
parts of the executive branch machinery, the government has a strong claim to
controlling them. In their role as potentially uniquely valuable contributors to
the marketplace of ideas, the government has a much weaker claim to control-
ling them. This tension is best reconciled by giving the government relatively
wide leeway to punish leakers through means tied to their status as executive
branch insiders, while keeping tight reigns on government punishments that
target leakers' personal freedom or property apart from their insider roles.
Second, courts already rely on institutionally specific reasoning to argue that
the First Amendment grants government employers substantial discretion to
punish employees for their speech. As explained earlier, courts rationalize this
160. I am very grateful to Geof Stone for raising and vigorously debating these points with me.
161. See generally Gia B. Lee, First Amendment Enforcement in Government Institutions and
Programs, 56 UCLA L. REv. 1691 (2009); Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace ofIdeas, 57
DUKE L.J. 821 (2008); Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners - Oh My! A Cautionary
Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1635
(2007); Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MiN*. L. REv. 1256 (2005);
Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARv. L. Rev. 84 (1998).
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approach in no small part by citing the government's heightened needs to
control speech when it acts as an employer It is extending such discretion to
government in its role as sovereign, and not resistance to the same, that
demands a new and independent justification.
As for calibration based on penalty severity, it is clearly warranted in at least
two cases, and worth serious consideration in a third. First, it is clearly
warranted as a basis to limit the reach of Snepp's dismissive approach to the
First Amendment considerations raised in that case. As discussed above, the
Snepp Court itself relied heavily on the tight fit between the penalty imposed
and the nature of Snepp's transgression. Second, it is warranted as a supplemen-
tal justification for distinguishing employment-based sanctions from criminal or
civil penalties. The central theoretical rationale for the institution-based distinc-
tion is the need to reconcile the tension between government employees' roles
as part of the executive branch machinery and their roles as uniquely valuable
potential speakers. As we have seen, this concern justifies distinguishing govern-
ment's capacity to punish as an employer from its capacity to do so as a
sovereign. This distinction is important not only as a matter of institutional
separation, but because it balances the value of government discretion over
speech against the dangers of the same. It does so by limiting the realms in
which, and hence the extent to which, government can punish speech with
relative ease.
A third reason to calibrate protections by penalty severity simply is to enable
a more delicate fine-tuning of the competing interests at stake, even where
penalties are not institutionally distinct. This rationale would apply where, for
example, criminal penalties are assessed under different standards depending on
their relative severity. Such an approach is not the norm in First Amendment
law, though it also is not unprecedented as defamation law and the strong
presumption against prior restraints reflect. As discussed above in Part III.B, a
two-pronged standard for judicial review of criminal or civil leak punishments,
varying with the punishments' relative severity, may be warranted in light of the
competing constitutional considerations at stake and the consequent difficulty in
calibrating speaker incentives. Yet given possible problems with this ap-
proach - including unwieldiness or diluted constitutional protections - this sug-
gestion is made tentatively, as a call for further consideration. For reasons
already discussed, however, judicial distinctions clearly are called for as be-
tween employment-based punishments and criminal or civil punishments.
CONCLUSION
Executive branch insiders who spill secrets without authorization embody a
necessary paradox of the constitutional design. The executive branch is struc-
tured to run energetically, and, when necessary, with secrecy. Yet it is also built
not just to withstand, but to facilitate occasional leaks. The founders, as we have
seen, wanted no part of a presidency staffed with "minions and favourites,"
persons whom the President could use as a "screen ... [to] hide ... his negli-
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gence, or inattention ... [or] criminality."'' 62 This paradox is an aspect of the
separation of powers, one that the First Amendment is designed to support.
Honoring this design entails remembering that classified information is, first
and foremost, information about government. It also entails a healthy suspicion
of government declarations to the effect that such information is off limits for
public review. Such suspicion is justified not only as a matter of theory, but in
light of the realities of massive over-classification and longstanding practices of
selective leaking.
None of this is to deny that some secrets are very necessary, that some leaks
deserve to be prosecuted, or that the executive branch has a constitutionally
legitimate interest in managing its operations and employees. But these points
must be placed in perspective. Some secrets are necessary, but many - perhaps
most, if experts from across administrations and parties are to be believed - are
not. Indeed, unnecessary secrecy itself can harm the national interest, including
national security. More to the point, the notions that the executive alone can and
must decide what shall be secret and what shall be known, and that checks on
free speech can turn on these designations, are a bridge too far. These notions
overlook a crucial half of the constitutional scheme for presidential power, a
scheme reflected in founding assurances that the President, while capable of
secrecy and vigor, will be "narrowly watched" so that the people can "dis-
cover[] with facility and clearness" his misdoings. 163
162. See supra notes 78, 81.
163. See supra note 68.
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